

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLASS AND ETHNICITY IN MOBILIZING RESOURCES FOR TERRORISM

by

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December 2000

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

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| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 2. REPORT DATE December 2000 | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|

| | |
|---|--------------------|
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Effectiveness of Class and Ethnicity in Mobilizing Resources for Terrorism | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS |
|---|--------------------|

| | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| 6. AUTHOR(S) Ernst, Joseph Adrian | |
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| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER |
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| 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER |
|---|--|

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

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|---|------------------------|
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE |
|---|------------------------|

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The ETA is still a functioning terrorist group whereas the Red Brigades has ceased to exist. A possible explanation is the ETA was more effective than the Red Brigades at mobilizing resources. After explaining the theory of mobilization, this thesis will apply the theory to the two groups. A subsequent comparison of the two groups' effectiveness at mobilizing resources will enable a judgment to be made on which group is more effective at mobilization. By demonstrating that the ETA was more effective than the Red Brigades at mobilizing people, this thesis will give an explanation for the survival of the ETA and the decline of the Red Brigades.

| | |
|---|---------------------------|
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS Terrorism, Mobilization, Red Brigades, ETA | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 88 |
| | 16. PRICE CODE |

| | | | |
|---|--|---|----------------------------------|
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL |
|---|--|---|----------------------------------|

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-9)
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**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLASS AND ETHNICITY
IN MOBILIZING RESOURCES FOR TERRORISM**

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
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

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The ETA is still a functioning terrorist group whereas the Red Brigades has ceased to exist. A possible explanation is the ETA was more effective than the Red Brigades at mobilizing resources. After explaining the theory of mobilization, this thesis will apply the theory to the two groups. A subsequent comparison of the two groups' effectiveness at mobilizing resources will enable a judgment to be made on which group is more effective at mobilization. By demonstrating that the ETA was more effective than the Red Brigades at mobilizing people, this thesis will give an explanation for the survival of the ETA and the decline of the Red Brigades.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis attempts to determine which of two terrorist groups, an ideologically based group (Red Brigades) and an ethnically based group (ETA or Basque Fatherland and Liberty), is more effective at mobilization. Mobilizing human resources is the method by which terrorist groups sustain their levels of membership. Without sustained or growing levels of membership, the group declines and soon ceases to exist. By determining a group's effectiveness at mobilization, judgments can be made on the likelihood of the group experiencing continued mobilization leading to continued operations or experiencing demobilization leading to decline.

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The definition of mobilization is the control of human resources by a group, in other words, the willing sacrifice by individuals to give their time and energies to the promotion of the group and its interests. Effective mobilization by a terrorist group requires a strong enough appeal to overcome the individual's hesitancy about joining a group that engages in illegal activities and whose members are often wanted by the

authorities. Effective mobilization also requires the terrorist group to appeal to as large a group as possible. If a terrorist group's message reaches a large group of people, the potential for mobilizing some of those individuals goes up.

This thesis will evaluate the effectiveness of the two terrorist groups in mobilizing people in three ways. The first way will be to examine how completely membership in the group absorbs an individual's life. Membership that is completely inclusive of an individual's everyday life requires a great deal of commitment. In order to convince the individual to make the total commitment to the group, the group must be able to effectively mobilize that individual. Analyzing whether a group's ideology is independent from its identity is the second way effectiveness will be determined. A group with a collective identity that is fixed but an ideology that is independent and flexible has a greater ability to appeal to a wider group of people than a group whose identity is fixed and ideology is linked to the identity. A group with an independent ideology can change or modify its ideology to appeal to more people without the fear of alienating the original group of people who are members based on a collective identity with the group. A group with a dependent ideology cannot change ideology without potentially alienating some members of this core group of support. The final way in which mobilization will be judged is the group's ability to successfully frame and symbolize its interests and grievances in such a way that appeals to a maximum number of people. By framing successfully, the group is able to package its grievances and interests in such a way that will motivate people to put the interests of the group ahead of

their own personal interests. The use of symbols and rhetoric increase a group's effectiveness at doing this.

These three criteria will be applied to both groups to determine how effective each is at mobilizing resources. The comparison of both groups' effectiveness will give an explanation for the survival of the ETA and the demise of the Red Brigades. This comparison will give insight into how to more effectively combat terrorist groups. By knowing how resources are mobilized, attempts can be made to counter the mobilization effort of the terrorist group and subsequently, to send the group into a period of demobilization and decline.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like thank Dr. David Tucker and Ambassador Rodney Minott, whose efforts, patience and direction are sincerely appreciated. The author also would like to convey his appreciation and love for his family: William, Grenda, Suzanne and Tim.

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I. CLASS BASED VERSUS ETHNICALLY BASED TERRORISM

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis will analyze and compare two terrorist groups, one ideologically based (the Red Brigades) and the other ethnically based (ETA or Basque Fatherland and Liberty), in order to determine if one of the two is more effective at mobilizing resources. These two groups were selected for this comparison not only because of the presence of multiple groups of both types in Europe, but also because of the number of similarities between the two groups. These similarities include methods of operating, targets chosen and the severity of government efforts to combat them. The similarities between the two groups allows for more variables to be removed from the comparison and a more accurate and focused comparison to be made of the two groups' effectiveness at using either ideology or ethnicity for mobilization.

The importance of comparing the ability of these groups to mobilize resources stems from the need to further understand terrorist groups and their behavior. Although terrorists rarely kill or injure large numbers of people, they pose a serious threat because of the means they use to attack, against which there are few ways to defend, and the often-unpredictable patterns of violence they spin, which puts nearly everyone in the affected country in harm's way. The threat posed by another country's military can be countered based on predictability and knowledge of how that military can be expected to act. The threat posed by a terrorist group is difficult to counter because it's hard to predict much about the group. When and where an attack will take place are obvious

unpredictable variables, but other factors that are just as important and unpredictable are a group's location, source of weapons or money and if a group has ceased to exist versus become dormant since its last known operation. By comparing ideological and ethno-nationalist groups and making some determinations about them based on this comparison, it might be possible to make more accurate predictions in the future about the expected lifespan or level of activity of a terrorist group. This comparison might not enable a prediction to be made as to where the next attack by a particular group would occur or where it gets its weapons from, but knowing what the motivation of a group is, be it ethno-nationalist or ideological, coupled with other information such as historical data relating to the group or the political climate where it operates, might make possible predictions about the group's expected lifespan.

B. BACKGROUND

Although terrorism as it is currently thought of is relatively new, dating back roughly fifty years, it is actually an old problem. There is evidence of actions which would be considered terrorist today being carried out two thousand years ago. There are also names of terrorist groups from hundreds of years ago that are commonplace words in today's vocabulary. Words such as zealot, thug and assassin come from groups that originated in the first, seventh and eleventh century, respectively.¹ Throughout the last two thousand years, terrorism has changed constantly, being used as both a religious and political tool, being used extensively during certain periods of time and very little during

¹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 89.

others. How it has been defined over the centuries has also changed. Terrorism has been defined at times as the fear inducing actions of groups trying to influence a people or a government and at other times as the fear inducing way of ruling that a particular government chose to employ.²

Although a long-established problem, it is only in the fifty years after World War Two that terrorism has emerged as a significant matter of international importance. Developments in media communications, advances in weapons technology and changes in the way people travel have changed terrorism in several ways. New technologies in media and communications have allowed terrorists to get their much desired publicity more quickly, allowing the news of terrorist incidents to reach around the globe almost instantaneously. With these improvements in mass communication and the media, kidnapping and the use of hostages has become a powerful tool for the terrorist. Advancements in explosives and triggering devices have enabled terrorists to carry out more innovative and bolder attacks with greater destructive power than ever before. A continuous increase in the volume of air travel made hijacking popular with terrorists until effective countermeasures made hijacking occurrences less frequent. The methods currently available for carrying out a terrorist attack are extremely difficult to detect and potentially more destructive, necessitating high levels of urgency in anti-terror efforts.

A wide range of motivations inspire terrorist groups and their members; examples of the different types of motivations include: nationalist, revolutionary (left-wing ideology,) far-right extremism, religious extremism and single-issue motivation. Two of

² Ibid., 23.

the dominant types of European groups in the post World War Two era are the ideological group and the ethno-nationalist group. An ideological group centers its existence on a political theme, such as the spread of the Marxist-Leninist revolution throughout the world. Such groups emerged in the post war era due to the growing tensions between major ideologies in the international arena. An ethno-nationalist group centers its existence on the shared ethnicity of its members, drawing upon this nationalism as motivation. These groups emerged in the post war era in attempts to help their respective ethnic groups win homelands and become their own nations. The post war decline of imperialism was a significant motivator for the attempts of these ethno-nationalist groups to form their own nations; the primary attempts at this were made through diplomacy and politics, but if these failed, then terrorism was resorted to. It is worth noting that terrorist groups seldom fall into one of these two groups exclusively; more often, a terrorist group will be a combination of characteristics with one particular dominant characteristic. For example, while both the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque separatist group, the ETA, are generally considered ethno-nationalist groups, they have both at some time advocated left-wing revolutionary ideologies. Another example is religious extremist groups, such as those in the Middle East, that often have deep ethno-nationalist sentiments, such as Hizbollah. The group's religious base is demonstrated through its name, which translates into 'Party of God', but the group also relies heavily on the Arab ethnicity of its members for mobilization.

C. METHODOLOGY

The methodology that will be used for this analysis will rely heavily on the theory of mobilization. In order for the comparison of the effectiveness of two groups in mobilizing their resources to be made, a solid foundation in the basic principles of mobilization as a theory needs to be set down. Besides understanding the basic concepts behind mobilization, it is important to know how mobilization relates to the comparison of the two groups. Aspects of mobilization important for this comparison are how long an individual joins the group for, how completely does membership encompass an individual's everyday life or how easily does the individual's loyalty shift to another group or another cause. These aspects are important for determining how effectively a group mobilizes because they are a good indicator of an individual's level of commitment. It takes a great deal of commitment for an individual to join for a long time, to immerse himself or herself into the group completely and to have an unshakable loyalty to the group. This high level of individual dedication indicates that the group was able to effectively mobilize that individual into putting the group's interests ahead of self-interest. A more detailed description of how mobilization will be measured for each group and why these standards of measurement are important will follow in the next chapter. These examples are just a few of the ways in which mobilization theory will be applied to the two groups in order to determine the effectiveness of each group in mobilizing its human resources.

Certain problems exist in trying to compare class and ethnicity as mobilizing factors. The biggest limitation directly relates to how broad and varied terrorism is. An

indicator of the broad scope of terrorism is the lack of a specific and accurate definition. There are many definitions, most of which are correct but not expansive enough. These definitions reflect an emphasis on the aspects of terrorism that the author is interested in, but usually little more. Terrorism is such a varied topic that it is difficult to create a single definition for it, much less place it into a single category or use a single school of thought when analyzing it. The broad scope of terrorism makes the comparison of ethnicity and class as mobilizing factors difficult because more variables need to be factored out. Without specific parameters on terrorism, several considerations become important to the accurate comparison of the two groups. Factors taken into account for this comparison are the type of state that the group formed in, such as an industrializing state, a colonial state or a fledgling state; and the level of violence of the group. The type of state a group is formed in is important because a group forming in a colonial state will have different grievances and opposition than a group forming in an already developed, independent state. Level of violence of the group is important because uncharacteristically low levels of violence could be considered anarchistic acts or merely isolated acts of protest and extremely high levels of violence could be a civil war or coup attempt. These factors were removed from this comparison by selecting two groups with similar origins, located in Western European nations and utilizing similar levels of violence.

Another limitation in the comparison is that there are other foundations for terrorist groups besides class and ethnicity, such as religion. These foundations often do not have well defined boundaries either. A certain group may be a combination of

multiple motivations, such as religion and ethnicity or even a combination of class and ethnicity. These hazy boundaries make the comparison more difficult and less accurate, but the two groups in this comparison were chosen with this consideration in mind. The Red Brigades has been considered a class-based group with negligible religious or ethnic influences. The ETA is not so clearly defined; during the formative period of the group, there was disagreement over whether to be an ethnically based group or a class-based group. For reasons that will be explained in the ETA case study, this group will be considered an ethnically based group.

D. THESIS ORGANIZATION

Chapter II will detail the theory and basic concepts of mobilization, its relation to terrorism and terrorist groups, and how it is used in the comparison between two terrorist groups. Chapter III is a case study examining the Basque separatist group (ETA) in Spain. A brief background of the group will be followed by an application of the mobilization theory to this group and its resources. Chapter IV is a case study that will examine the Italian Red Brigades, an ideologically motivated left wing revolutionary group. Again, a brief background of the group will be given, followed by the mobilization theory applied to this group and its resources. Chapter V will examine the differences between the two groups and the respective application of the mobilization theory to each. Conclusions will be drawn about the effectiveness of each group in mobilizing. This may aid future predictions about the behavior or lifespan of terrorist groups.

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II. MOBILIZATION THEORY

A. INTRODUCTION

Successfully mobilizing resources is a critical prerequisite for any terrorist group that expects to have a reasonable chance of achieving its goals. In his book *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Charles Tilly states that without mobilization, a group cannot contend for power or exert influence over a group or government.³ The inability to contend for power or exert influence is a result of a lack of resources brought about by ineffective mobilization. And while resources are an important part of a terrorist group's struggle, one specific category of resources stands out from the rest, that is, human resources. A group's ability to mobilize its human resources goes a long way to determining the amount of success it can potentially enjoy. Conversely, a group's inability to effectively mobilize its resources is an early and clear indication that it will not survive.⁴

Predictions can be made about a group or the expected amount of success it will have in attaining its goals by judging its effectiveness in rallying support and enlisting new members. The first step in doing this is defining mobilization theory. The second step is putting the mobilization theory into context with regard to terrorist groups, including differentiating between the multiple levels and forms of mobilization and

³ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1978), 78.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

relating these various levels of mobilization to terrorist groups. The last step is to describe the means by which terrorist groups' ability to mobilize human resources will be judged. We will derive a list of factors from mobilization theory that can then be applied to a terrorist group in an effort to determine how effectively that group mobilizes its resources. On that basis, individual groups can be compared with each other in order to determine which group is a more effective mobilizer and thus is less likely to experience demobilization and subsequent demise.

B. THE THEORY OF MOBILIZATION

Mobilization is important not just to terrorist groups, but to any group seeking to voice its concern or achieve goals. The means a group uses might be different, ranging from peaceful demonstrations to protests to riots to armed action to terrorism, but each group requires effective mobilization of human resources to have an even remote chance of achieving success. According to Ted Robert Gurr, mobilization is the extent to which group members are prepared to commit their energies and resources to collective action on behalf of their common interests.⁵ A group's strength derives directly from this willingness on the part of an individual to voluntarily give his or her time and effort to the group. A slight modification on this definition of mobilization comes from Charles Tilly. He augments Gurr's definition of mobilization as the willingness of individuals to sacrifice for the group by stating that mobilization is the extent that these resources are

⁵ Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 127.

under the collective control of the group.⁶ According to Tilly, merely having a number of willing individuals subordinate to the leadership of the group is mobilization potential. Real mobilization is actual control of these assets to the degree that these resources will deliver the desired result when called upon to do so.⁷ Control over these resources gives the group the capability to contend for power and exert influence.

C. MOBILIZATION IN CONTEXT

Mobilization is not a new concept; it has been recognized as an important element in early works on social movements and collective action. The spectrum of groups that the term social movement encompasses is very diverse, ranging from the peaceful to those that utilize violence, terrorism and rebellion. Social movements have been defined as "a deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian' community."⁸

Just as there are a wide variety of social movements, there are varying degrees of mobilization associated with the different type of social movements. A group that stages demonstrations or protest rallies requires a significantly lower amount of mobilization than a group that utilizes terrorism or has an ultimate goal of instigating rebellion.⁹ A terrorist group is a group that requires an extreme commitment from its members to

⁶ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 54.

⁷ Ibid., 69.

⁸ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 27.

⁹ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 189.

achieve the necessary level of mobilization. This includes not just those responsible for carrying out attacks but also those providing information, hiding weapons or even housing and feeding group members. Even though a terrorist group might have interests and objectives that are the same as those of an individual, a great deal is required to motivate that individual to accept the tremendous costs associated with being a member of a terrorist group. Costs of membership include being wanted by authorities, isolation from family and society and even a strict and disciplined lifestyle dictated by the terrorist group. In order for the individual to accept these costs and join the group, the group needs to appeal to the individual strongly enough so that the individual puts aside his or her self-interests and adopts the interests and objectives of the group. Appealing to an individual's emotions and most deeply held sentiments is an effective and powerful way to convince the individual to put aside his or her self-interest and mobilize to support the cause of the group.

Once a terrorist group has successfully mobilized resources, maintaining control over these resources becomes a major area of concern. The high level of mobilization required for groups with extreme means and aims is difficult to maintain and many groups do not succeed in maintaining that level of mobilization. These groups soon face demobilization as they can no longer elicit and control sufficient human resources to continue to survive. This struggle to survive and maintain a level of mobilization that will at least allow them to function at a minimal level becomes most terrorist groups' primary objective. Martha Crenshaw states that terrorist violence is an end in itself, with

the actual violence becoming increasingly meaningless to society.¹⁰ What Crenshaw is arguing here is that no matter what progresses a group makes in its struggle, the level of violence will remain high even if it is no longer accomplishing any meaningful purpose. The only purpose served at this point would be in essence to give the group something to do, for it can be argued that a group without anything to do faces the threat of stagnating and disbanding. Self-preservation becomes the primary goal of the terrorist group, replacing the goal of remedying the grievances that mobilized the group in the first place.

Maintaining control over resources is not only a matter of preventing members from quitting but also a matter of preventing other groups from convincing members to change allegiance and offer up their efforts and support to the other group. The group most commonly loses control over resources to other groups, factions of the main group or even splinter groups.¹¹ Effective and sustained mobilization by the group requires that it form coalitions among diverse segments and contending leaders.¹² A terrorist group is rarely a homogenous group of individuals who all think alike; typically a group is a collection of individuals or sub-groups with varying beliefs and opinions, with some sort of agreed upon common ground for the beliefs of the group. Although this sometimes requires concessions to be made and the acceptance of views and goals that aren't necessarily popular, it helps maintain the level of mobilization maintaining a single large

¹⁰ Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Volume 3, No. 1 (Spring 1991): 83.

¹¹ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 76.

¹² Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, 127.

pool of human resources rather than a number of smaller pools consisting of competing groups, splinter groups or factions of the main group. The maintenance of the largest possible collective unit, although often times very difficult, is the most certain means of ensuring that mobilization is not lost through factionalization and defections.¹³

As stated earlier, the mobilization of resources by terrorist groups is both difficult to achieve and to maintain. It is also difficult to determine if a terrorist group is particularly effective at mobilizing resources or not, short of a group's complete demobilization, indicating a high degree of ineffectiveness. This analysis of groups' ability to mobilize their human resources will be based on three criteria: how inclusive group membership is of an individual's everyday life, the separation between a group's ideology and its common identity and finally how well the group frames its grievances and aims to increase the attractiveness of joining the group. These three criteria will be applied to both the ETA and Red Brigades in order to analyze each group's effectiveness at mobilization. The reason for the selection of these three criteria is to focus on the relationship between the individual and the group and to place minimal emphasis on the relationship between the group and outside factors such as other groups or the government. By concentrating on the relationship between the individual and the group, emphasis can be placed on the group's efforts to mobilize potential members and an analysis can be made of how effective the group is at accomplishing this mobilization.

¹³ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 148.

D. MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENT FACTORS

One of the toughest aspects of mobilization is judging how well a group does in mobilizing its resources. Although it is easy to determine that a defunct terrorist group did a poor job at mobilization and easy to determine that a terrorist group that is in the public consciousness and gaining new members is successful at mobilization, most terrorist groups fall somewhere in the middle, where it is harder to make an accurate judgment on the group's mobilization effectiveness. Accurate determination of terrorist groups' ability to mobilize human resources requires careful consideration and study into its behavior, characteristics and history.

The two groups studied in this thesis, one a class based group and the other an ethnically based group, will be analyzed based on three separate factors in an attempt to determine which of the two is more effective at mobilizing human resources. The first factor will be to determine how close membership in a group comes to absorbing the members' whole lives.¹⁴ This is a good measure of mobilization because membership in such a group requires a great deal of commitment on the part of the individual. The group must be effective at mobilization to convince the individual to give up a normal life and begin a life underground with minimal interaction with family, friends and society in general. The second factor will be whether the group has an ideology that is independent from its source of collective identity and what effect this has. An ideology separate from the group's identity allows the group flexibility in changing its ideology as it sees fit without changing the identity of the group, thus reducing the possibility of the

group facing the possible loss of support of the members who would no longer have a strong identification with the group. Although the possibility exists that the group would be able to replace the lost group of support with another supportive group, the repeated replacement of support does not promote a strong feeling of commitment to the group on the part of the members. The lack of strong commitment to the group is not effective mobilization.

A group's identity and ideology are both important elements that help determine group objectives, targets and type of people that are recruited for membership. Identity is the characteristic of the group that gives the members a common bond. A group with a strong sense of identity has a strong union between members, even if the group has no particular grievances or objectives. Groups with strong senses of identity don't necessarily have strong senses of ideology; the members might have a strong bond strong with each other but no real objective towards which the group would fight. Examples of group identity are the Basque or Irish Catholic identity of the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA or Basque Fatherland and Liberty) and Irish Republican Army (IRA), respectively, the laborer and student identity of the Red Brigades or the Islamic identity of the Hizbollah. Ideology gives a group a sense of purpose. A strong ideology gives the group a goal to strive for, such as the independence of an ethnic group, the overthrow of the capitalist government or the advancement of a religion over another. A group with a strong ideology does not necessarily have a strong identity; a group might have a strong ideology to give it a definite aim to its efforts, but a weak identity leading to little group

¹⁴ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 64.

cohesion and sentiment of the individual towards the group. Examples of a group ideology are the Marxist-Leninist destruction of the capitalist governments and the protection of an ethnic group's territory and traditions as well as the creation of an independent or autonomous region for that ethnic group.

The final factor in determining each group's effectiveness at mobilizing will be to analyze how each group frames its issues of contention; does the group frame its interests with symbols that are traditional and elicit emotion, such as language or a historic event, or does the group frame its interests based on symbols that rely less on emotion and more on rewards, such as equal rights for all members of a certain class.¹⁵

According to Tilly, one of the most important methods for determining a group's efficiency at mobilizing is to analyze how inclusive of the individual's life is membership in the group.¹⁶ The standards that will be used to determine inclusiveness are the amount of time an individual has been a member of the group, the amount of energy devoted to the group including how much of his or her daily activity takes place within the group, the proportion of all social interaction between members and other people in which group membership is somehow relevant, how early of an age the group recruits from and finally, the ability of members to seek refuge and comfort from loved ones who are not members.¹⁷ The first standard, the length of an individual's membership, is important because the longer an individual has been a member of a terrorist group, the more likely

¹⁵ Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd Ed., 109.

¹⁶ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 64.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 64.

that it is that that individual is a highly dedicated member and was effectively mobilized to join the group. The second standard, the amount of energy dedicated to the group, is important because high amounts of energy sacrificed for the group also indicate that the individual is committed to the group and was effectively mobilized by the group. The third standard, more plainly put, is the number of everyday social interactions that occur between group members and other people in which the group membership is involved. This is a good indicator of mobilization because a high proportion of social interactions between group members and other people that takes into account group membership indicates the high level of these individual's commitment to the group and a concern for it that is deeply rooted in their day-to-day lives. The fourth standard, age of recruits, is a good indicator because this demonstrates how readily youth accept the appeals the group makes to them. If younger and younger people accept the appeal the terrorist group has made to them, then these younger members are in the group from an earlier age and become more involved in the group. For these younger members, membership in the group becomes more inclusive. The final standard, the ability of members to seek refuge and comfort from loved ones who are not members, is good at demonstrating inclusiveness because an inability by group members to seek non-member support forces members to turn to fellow members, thus reinforcing the inclusiveness within everyday life.

The second factor that will be examined will be whether or not the group has an ideology separate from its identity and what effect this has on the group. A group with an ideology separate from its identity has an ideology that can be modified without changing

the identity of the group. An example of this is a group with an identity of a common ethnic background and an unrelated ideology, such as the class-based promotion of workers' rights. The two case studies are opposites on this factor, and how each group fared in this will be used to help determine effectiveness at mobilization. A group mobilizes around certain interests and identities, and as time progresses, interests change. In fact, new interests that come about are often in direct conflict with interests around which the group was mobilized in the first place.¹⁸ For example, most of the members of ETA have mobilized with the group based on their shared culture and ethnic identity as Basques. The interests of the group are defined, but are flexible to change or be modified, without conflicting with the mobilizing factors, that is, the identity of the group. A class-based group, such as the Red Brigade, has an ideology, with the associated interests, that is closely linked to its identity. With an ideology that is both the source of the group's mobilization of its members, and expression of its interests, there is little room for the group to be flexible and modify its ideology without facing the possibility of causing some alienation among the members that support the group based on their common identity. As will be seen, the Red Brigade had an identity of class-based worker protection which doubled as its ideology. But when the group attempted to modify its ideology to include more emphasis for national revolution, the workers who formed the base of support for the group lost some of their sense of identity with the group. Because of this lack of flexibility between the group's ideology and identity, the radical change made to the ideology affected the identity of the group as well.

¹⁸ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 57.

Subsequently, the group suffered a partial demobilization of its worker base of support. As the example showed, if a group's ideology were to change or be modified in any way, then there would be a difference between what the group was fighting for and what the members joined the group to fight for. If a significant part of the group's base of support was mobilized based on the original interests and the connected ideology, then the group would run the risk of witnessing a partial or even total demobilization of this now disenfranchised base of support once the group modified its ideology, and subsequently, its identity.

The final factor in analyzing mobilization is to look at how both groups frame their grievances and aims in order to appeal to as many people as possible and gain maximum support. Both groups will be examined to determine if the group frames its issues based on symbols and culture or on incentives and rewards. Tarrow defines frames as a method of constructing a perspective or a meaning that resonates with a population's dispositions and communicates a uniform message.¹⁹ In other words, how well a group constructs frames is how well the group is able to appeal to a population's predispositions and make the emotional connection to potential members. The very act of joining a terrorist group is a largely emotional act, so a very strong emotional connection is needed between the group and the potential member to overcome the hesitation the individual might have about making such a difficult decision. If a group can portray the issues and interests it is concerned with in an emotional manner that will stir up strong sentiments among potential members, it will have a greater chance of

overcoming the individual's hesitancy than less emotional appeals. A group's success at mobilizing resources might depend solely on the ability to frame the grievances and aims. If the group is able to frame its interests in such a way that appeals to emotion, it is likely the group will enjoy a high degree of mobilization. If that same group frames those same interests in a manner that does not appeal to the emotions and sentiments of the prospective members, the group will not experience much mobilization. This emotional attachment is a very powerful motivator, creating a psychological investment by the individual. Once that individual has been mobilized to join, the stronger the emotional connection, the longer the period of time that individual is likely to remain in the group.

The analysis of the mobilization effectiveness of the two groups in the case studies will be done by using the three determinants of mobilization that were laid out previously: how inclusive membership is to each individual's life, the separation of ideology and identity and what effect this has, and the framing of a group's interests and grievances.

¹⁹ Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd Ed., 110.

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III. THE BASQUE INSURGENT CASE

A. INTRODUCTION

In the last thirty years, Spain has experienced one of the highest levels of terrorist violence in all European countries due in most part to the Basque separatist group Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA.)²⁰ The ETA is an ethnically based terrorist group. The group's goal has been independence or at least greater autonomy for the Basque region from the central Spanish government and it gets a majority of its support and members from the Basque community in the northern regions of Spain. In fact, the ETA and the Basque conflict with the Spanish government is a useful case study in the comparison of the ethnically based versus class based mobilization of resources because of the ETA's success in mobilization. The ETA has so successfully mobilized active members and support from the Basque community that the group has been able to survive years of continued operations and a constant and fierce opposition from the Spanish government. The ETA has gained significant levels of support from the Basque community for a period of time that has seen both the mobilization and demobilization of a number of class and ethnically based groups in Europe, making the ETA one of the most durable and effectively mobilized groups.

During its years of operation, the ETA has remained flexible and adept at adjusting to changing conditions both within the group and in the Basque society. Since

its beginning, the ETA has faced an internal debate over following a nationalist or class based ideology but the group has always had an ethno-nationalist foundation first and foremost. In *The Basque Insurgents*, Robert Clark makes this distinction quite clear: "There is no question that the Basque struggle exemplifies ethnic nationalism in modern industrial society and that ETA exemplifies the use of armed assault to further ethnic nationalist aims."²¹ The Basque nationality is one of the ancient nationalities in Europe and is unlike any other; remnants of the civilization indicate that the group's origins date back as far as 20,000 B.C.²² While debate over ideologies divided the group several times, the ETA never wavered from its identity as a group fighting for ethnic Basque interests.²³

B. ORIGINS OF BASQUE NATIONALITY

Basque nationalism dates to the 19th century with the centralization and industrialization of the Basque region coupled with the Spanish attempts to unify the state.²⁴ For the seven hundred years leading up to the 19th century, the reigning Spanish monarch granted substantial power of self-government to the different regions under

²⁰ Goldi Shabad and Francisco Jose Llera Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," In *Terrorism in Context*. Martha Crenshaw, ed. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 410.

²¹ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 8.

²² Ibid., 12.

²³ Ibid., 276.

²⁴ James Anderson, "Separatism and Devolution: the Basques in Spain," In *Shared Space: Divided Space, Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization*. Michael Chisholm and David M. Smith, eds. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 139.

Madrid's control. During this period, the Basque region utilized its own language, laws, customs and cultural symbols while existing under the ultimate control of the Spanish monarchy. What developed was a strong sense of ethnicity within the Basque community. The sentiment of ethnicity may become ethnic nationalism when an outside force attempts to eliminate a group's sense of ethnicity through oppression. The need to protect its sense of ethnicity from elimination causes the ethnic group to perceive itself as a nation or nationality with a need for its own political structures to protect itself and even to provide a group with the incentive to demand its own sovereign state.²⁵ The efforts of the Spanish state in the middle of the 19th century at centralization and industrialization led to several effects that changed Basque ethnic identity into ethnic nationalism. Industrialization was rather successful in the Basque region and created prosperity. However, this prosperity was enjoyed on a large scale by only a small group of industrialists and oligarchs who subsequently attempted to use their power to link more closely the Basque regions with the Spanish seat of power in an attempt to preserve this prosperity for the few. Although these oligarchs were Basques, they favored the Spanish industrialization because they stood to benefit. The remaining majority of Basques were left with little opportunity to benefit from this industrialization. This majority of people were the old economic base of the Basque region: the farmers and merchants who held strong ethnic sentiments. The intrusive Spanish industrialization threatened the nationalist group's economic well-being, which led to even stronger ethnic sentiments of 'Basques versus Spain' from the latter group. Attempts by the Basques

²⁵ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*, 5.

farmers and merchants to benefit from the industrialization of their region exposed them to rampant Spanish exploitation and pollution of the Basque region. The direct threat to the Basque community came in 1876 when the Spanish government took away the Basque's political rights of self-government. The formation in 1892 of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) was the political embodiment of the Basque concern for the protection of their collective identity and would be the "political vehicle by which Basque autonomy would eventually be obtained."²⁶

The next significant event that solidified the Basque sense of nationalism was the Spanish Civil War that broke out in July 1936. In the Civil War, the German bombing of the city of Guernica, historically symbolic of Basque independence, and the intense oppression of the emerging Franco regime were important to the solidification of the sentiments of nationalism. What was perceived by the Basques as industrial and economic exploitation of their provinces by Franco coupled with the immigration of thousands of Spanish workers into Basque territory to compete for scarce jobs and benefits did little to help Basques prosper economically. This continued Spanish economic success at the expense of the Basques further fueled the Basque nationalist sentiments that were mounting. More importantly, Franco attempted to "eradicate Basque distinctiveness once and for all and to create a 'single personality, Spanish'." Any public display or symbol of Basque political and cultural identity was repressed by the regime and led directly to the Basques viewing their lands as militarily occupied by

²⁶ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*, 14.

an increasingly illegitimate Spanish state.²⁷ With all forms of ethnic identity and political expression of their grievances made illegal by the regime, younger Basque nationalists began to feel increasingly frustrated with both the Franco government and their own ineffective and sometimes exiled government. "Franco's often indiscriminate repression in the Basque country over the next four decades had the effect of transforming the forces of Basque nationalism. It resulted in the bulk of the population becoming more united politically than at any time before or since."²⁸ This growing unity had no means of release, building to a point where the nationalists were more and more willing to go to extreme measures. The ethnic nationalism that emerged from the conflict with the Spanish state was in defense of the traditional society and would soon become extreme enough to facilitate the creation of the ETA.²⁹

C. THE FORMATION OF THE ETA

Even though the repression of Franco's regime began in the summer of 1937, the ETA did not officially form until the summer of 1959. In the span of this time, several groups were formed to promote the Basque identity and to prevent the regime's repression from eradicating the Basque culture. In 1959, elements of these groups, mostly radical youths, broke away from their respective groups, claiming the established groups were too conservative and the older generations too passive. These fractionalized elements came together to form the ETA. From the beginning, the group "asserted

²⁷ Shabad and Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," 419.

²⁸ Anderson, "Separatism and Devolution: the Basques in Spain," 139.

²⁹ Ibid., 141.

claims for the independence and the reunification of the Basque provinces, the defense of the Basque identity and language, the struggle against police repression and military occupation of the Basque country by the Spanish state, and solidarity with workers' demands."³⁰ At this early stage, the ETA mobilized what support and members it had through their collective identity as Basques and specifically, through the identification and the need to protect the Basque language, Euskara.³¹ Although the group had and still has decidedly nationalist foundations to its aims, the debate went on within the group about whether the group's organizing principles would be class based or ethnicity based. The ETA could organize on a class basis but still be considered an ethno-nationalist group for several reasons. First, the ideology of the class struggle originated out of the desire for the Basque workers to be rid of the oppressive conditions to which they were subjected under Spanish rule. Even though this was a class-based goal, it had the more important underlying nationalist sentiments of 'Basque versus Spain' to it. Second, the ETA always held the ethno-nationalist principle of independence for the Basque provinces above any other principle, especially the principle of class revolution. The principle of Basque independence has been a constant in Basque ideology and has historically been nearly non-negotiable during peace discussions between the Spanish government and the ETA and other Basque groups. Lastly, the ETA used ethnic identity and nationalism to mobilize significantly more frequently than it used class identity and

³⁰ Shabad and Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," 426.

³¹ Cynthia L. Irvin, *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 69.

leftist ideology. The few occasions of class mobilization used by the ETA are overshadowed by countless instances of the ETA utilizing nationalism, making it accurate to refer to the ETA as an ethno-national organization versus a combination ethno-national and class based organization.³²

By the time the ETA had claimed its first victim in 1968, the group had already experienced five assemblies for ideological debate and had been a part of numerous strikes, labor unrests, demonstrations, distributions of ideological information and other non-violent activities.³³ But despite the factionalizations and disagreements that occurred over the next decade, the degree of mobilization and support enjoyed by the group increased dramatically, demonstrated by the increasing numbers of active members in the group and the growing support from the Basque public. Between 1968 and 1973, the degree of mobilization was relatively low, with the organization tentatively becoming more active and utilizing more human resources. Between 1974 and 1977 the level of mobilization increased steadily until the period of 1978 through 1980, which was the ETA's most intense years with the highest amount of mobilization and the highest number of attacks and deaths. The periods of 1981 through 1987 witnessed a reduction in operations as mobilization tapered off from the 1978-1980 levels and finally the period beginning in 1988 when the degree of mobilization declined to the levels seen in the mid

³² Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*, 275-276.

³³ Ibid., 35-48.

1970s.³⁴ But even in the late 1980s, when the ETA was able to mobilize a dwindling number of new members, the group still had a significant amount of support from the Basque nationalist community, despite the growing public perception of the uselessness of the ETA violence in a time of restored of Basque autonomy from the Spanish government.³⁵

By drawing upon the collective identification of the Basque culture, language and traditions and on the growing need to protect them from extinction, the ETA was able to mobilize members and support from the Basque nationalist community and sustain this level of mobilization for a significant length of time. By continuously mobilizing at an effective level, the group ensured itself of a longer life span and more opportunities to achieve its goals.

D. EFFECTIVENESS AT MOBILIZATION EFFORTS

As described earlier, the Basque culture is one of the oldest in Europe and has developed both a unique set of cultural characteristics and a deep tradition that is firmly embedded in Basque society. The ETA was successfully able to capitalize on this strong sense of collective identity and turn it into both members and support for the group and its actions. For the purposes of this thesis and the comparison that will be made to a class based terrorist group, the ETA's efforts at mobilization will be gauged using three tests.

³⁴ Robert P. Clark, *Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975-1988*. (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1990), 15.

³⁵ Shabad and Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," 464.

The first will be to examine how completely an individual's membership in the group encompasses that person's daily life, including the length of time in the group, the length of time each day dedicated to the group, the number of everyday social interactions that occur between group members and other people in which the membership of the group is involved, how young of an age the group recruits, and the ability of members to seek comfort and refuge from those who are not members. The second test will be to evaluate the group's ideology and identity. If a group has an ideology (Marxism versus independence of Basque region from Spain) that is independent of its identity (a worker's party versus Basque ethnicity), we can determine the effects that this separation of ideology and identity has on the group's ability to mobilize. A separation between ideology and identity allows a group flexibility in adapting its ideology to changing conditions, while maintaining a constant identity. A group can potentially change its ideology from class-based to nationalism and back, but if the group has an unchanging identity of ethnicity, it will be able to maintain its mobilization instead of alienating its members through changing ideologies. There is the possibility that a group might lose some members to the feelings of alienation and then be able to mobilize other people who might identify with the group. The danger with this repeated replacing of the core group of support every time the group decides to change ideology is that it does not foster an environment of commitment. This lack of strong commitment does not make for effective mobilization. The last test will judge how well the group frames and symbolizes its grievances. By effectively framing and symbolizing its grievances, the

group is able to make its goals and causes more attractive to a greater number of potential members or at least make the group cause seem more worthwhile to sympathizers.

As explained in chapter two, when considering how completely an individual's membership in a terrorist group encompasses his or her daily life, there are a number of factors to be considered. These include the length of time in the group, the length of time each day dedicated to the group, the number of everyday interactions between members and others in which membership is somehow important, how young an age group the terrorist group recruits from (to determine how strongly youth accept the appeal of the group,) and finally, the ability of members to seek refuge and comfort from those who are not members (the inability of group members to seek refuge from those outside the group forces members to turn to fellow members for this refuge, increasing the degree to which membership encompasses that individual's life).

Applying these factors to the ETA shows a high level of inclusiveness in everyday life, indicating effective mobilization at the individual level. While there is little data that shows the length of membership within the group, there are strong indications that membership in the group requires daily commitment. Interviews conducted for Robert Clark's *The Basque Insurgents* indicate that "after joining the organization their former friend and comrade seemed totally absorbed by his new responsibilities and duties" and "ETA has embedded itself organizationally in the everyday life of the Basque village."³⁶ Individuals whose membership in the group is this inclusive are more likely to put more energy into what they're doing for the group

and to put more at risk for the group's interests. Furthermore, ETA has been successful in recruiting members at early ages, or at least presenting the group's cause in a manner that would gain sympathy from younger groups.³⁷ An individual mobilized at an earlier age will be more likely to have the goals and interests of the group ingrained more deeply than an individual who is mobilized at a later age. Since the Basque community deeply values family and is tightly knit, ETA members have been able to maintain support and find refuge with not only their immediate families, but their local communities as well, even if the community does not have very many actual members in the ETA. ETA members being supported by their families and communities shows a high level of support that is generated for the group. Membership in the group that requires much of a member's energy and time, the involvement of younger and younger recruits and a strong appeal to the Basque community's sense of family has enabled the ETA to mobilize members successfully and to high levels of commitment.

The next test to be applied to the ETA is whether the group has an identity independent of its ideology. The ETA has an identity separate from its ideology, which allows the group flexibility in its ideology. The ability to maintain a constant identity while being able to modify its ideology enables the group to appeal to people with both ethnically based and class-based grievances and potentially achieve a higher degree of mobilization. The very debates that took place within the ETA leadership about whether to adopt a Marxist ideology versus an ideology of earning Basque independence from

³⁶ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*, 161.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 144.

Spain is proof of the group's separation of identity from ideology. During the time that the group's ideology was not decided upon, the group maintained the same identity, that is, an identity of an ethno-nationalist based group focused on the common identity of its Basque members. And during this period, the group enjoyed fairly high levels of mobilization, indicating that the identity of the ETA as an ethno-national group was more important for mobilization than the ideology of the group, which vacillated back and forth.³⁸ A group with its identity connected to its ideology, such as a group with an identity of a Marxist social revolutionary group and an ideology of Marxist social revolution, runs the risk of facing an inability to mobilize resources based on its identity if its related ideology is discredited or undergoes a period of unpopularity. A group such as the ETA, however, can maintain its identity as an ethno-nationalist group and utilize multiple ideologies such as Marxism or Basque independence in order to remain flexible and appeal to a greater section of the community.³⁹ A potential member or sympathizer can be either a Basque nationalist or interested in the class-based workers' revolution if the ETA has the identity of the Basque nationalist protector while simultaneously part of its ideology includes the instigation of a class based revolution. The flexibility of this separation allows for higher levels of mobilization.

The final test to be used on the ETA is to determine how well the group frames and symbolizes its grievances. Framing and symbolizing grievances is important because it makes the goals and interests of the group appeal to a greater section of people. If a

³⁸ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*, 261.

³⁹ Irvin, *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*, 43.

group can package and present itself and what it is striving for in such a way that has an appeal to the widest possible group of people, the levels of mobilization will increase for that group. Joining a group that engages in activities as extreme as terrorism is obviously an emotional decision that involves a great deal of commitment and willingness to sacrifice on the part of the individual. If a group can frame its objectives in such a manner as to appeal on the emotional level to the individual, mobilization of that individual will be more likely. The ETA provides a powerful example of doing this successfully. Preserving their culture and traditions is a rational objective, but by framing this goal in a more emotional context, by declaring for example that they stand for the protection of the Basque language, Euskera, against the destructive efforts of the occupational forces of the Spanish oppressors, the ETA is able to make the same objective more urgent and resonate more loudly with a greater number of Basques.⁴⁰ The ETA was exceptionally successful at this during the Franco regime, during which all aspects of the conflict between the Basque nationalists and the Spanish government were converted into a matter of cultural and ethnic survival for the Basques.⁴¹ The successful utilization of symbols and the framing of a group's interests and objectives in an emotional manner is an effective method of mobilization. In *Militant Nationalism*, Cynthia Irvin writes that "exclusive control of symbols is therefore of utmost concern and importance to the leaders of nationalist movement organizations, since they seek to use

⁴⁰ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*, 33.

⁴¹ Shabad and Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," 424.

these symbols to mobilize their constituency and expand their movement.”⁴² This was something that has been successfully accomplished by the ETA during nearly its entire lifespan. The group’s ability to put its grievances and objectives in a frame of reference that the largest number of individuals can identify with has allowed the group to mobilize successfully.

E. CONCLUSION

The ETA has been able to maintain high levels of mobilization of its human resources through all three methods examined here. The high degree of inclusiveness for a member of the group, the ability of the group to draw in potential members with its identity while remaining flexible with its ideology and the success the ETA has had in presenting its objectives and grievances in an emotional and urgent manner to a maximum number of potential members and supporters are three causes for this success. A terrorist group is nothing more than a complex organization that is formed as a rational response to a set of environmental circumstances or problems.⁴³ Once the group is formed as a response, it attempts to achieve a specific objective to solve the problem. Through mobilization, the ETA maintained its operations for such an extended period of time that it has had the opportunity to affect the course of events in Spain to a degree that many terrorist groups have not had in their respective countries.

⁴² Irvin, *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*, 17.

⁴³ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980*, 276.

IV. THE ITALIAN RED BRIGADES

A. INTRODUCTION

Italy has had a history of a high level of political violence with the exception of 21 years under a fascist dictatorship. Early examples of political unrest and violence date back as far as 1860 and historically there has been a politically based incident of violence at least once every two years, with the exception of the years with a fascist government.⁴⁴ Throughout the years, the citizens of Italy have demonstrated more political awareness and participation than the citizens of many other nations. Instead of the malaise or apathy towards politics that affects the populace of other nations, Italians have traditionally placed a great deal of importance on involvement and activity in the political realm. Not only has Italian society placed emphasis on involvement, but it has also placed a great deal of emphasis on an individual's political identity; that is, not just being aware of the system, but choosing a set of political values and beliefs and holding on to them.⁴⁵ With this strong politicization of society has come a high degree of violence and armed conflict, as well as a degree of acceptance of this violence.⁴⁶ This politicization of Italian society coupled with an acceptance of a certain amount of associated violence has created a culture of conflict, which has proven to be fertile ground for the creation of terrorist

⁴⁴ Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*. (London: Westview Press, 1987), 20.

⁴⁵ Donatella Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," In *Terrorism in Context*. Martha Crenshaw, ed. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 143.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 144.

groups.⁴⁷ Italy has experienced almost every form of terrorism and from almost every source, from anarchists assassinating King Umberto I at the beginning of the century to neo-Fascist and Marxist-Leninist terrorism towards the end of the century.⁴⁸

The Italian experience with terrorism is unique compared to the experiences of other European nations for several reasons. First, the strength and the impact of right wing terrorists were greater than in any other European nation. The interaction and competition between the left wing and right wing terrorist groups had a significant impact on the way both groups and the government developed and operated. Another difference that distinguished the Italian experience from others was the sheer number of revolutionary left wing terrorists. Although countries like Germany, Japan and the United States all had left wing terrorists, no other country had as many groups with as many members as Italy did.⁴⁹ The large numbers of left wing terrorists in Italy increased the threat posed to the security of the government as well as its citizens. The large numbers of terrorists also allowed groups an increased ability to conduct operations for longer periods of time and to remain in the forefront of the Italian consciousness for a longer period of time. The groups of Italy had such large memberships that the typical

⁴⁷ Ibid., 112.

⁴⁸ Vittorfranco S. Pisano, *Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures*. (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress Law Library, 1979), 29.

⁴⁹ Weinberg and Eubank, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*, 3.

losses in membership, due to arrests, defections, death, etc. did not impact the Italian groups' personnel resources as significantly as it did on other European groups.

A critical element in the emergence of right wing and especially left wing terrorist groups was the development of strong sentiments for both the right wing fascist movement and the left wing Marxist-Leninist movement. Both of these sentiments have deep roots in Italian society, but the left wing movement gained significantly more support from its respective segment of Italian society following the events of World War Two. The historic episodes of the Italian left fighting against the fascists during the war increased the leftist movement's following amongst the people for the next half century.⁵⁰ From World War Two on, the leftist movement evolved and grew and eventually became the source of the many left wing terrorist groups that plagued Italy, most significantly among them, the Red Brigade. An examination of the origins of the Italian leftist movement is necessary for a better understanding of the reasons behind the founding of the Red Brigade.

B. THE ORIGINS OF THE ITALIAN LEFTIST MOVEMENT

The date most commonly associated with the beginning of the modern era of terrorist violence in Italy is December 12, 1969. On that date, a bomb planted by right wing extremists exploded in the Piazza Fontana office of the National Agricultural Bank

⁵⁰ Leonard Weinberg, "The Violent Life: Left- and Right-Wing Terrorism in Italy," In *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations*. Peter Merkl, ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), 147.

in Milan.⁵¹ Although this bombing was the action of right wing extremists, it was important event in the development of the left wing movement. The bombing was not a spontaneous act; it was merely the culmination of years of mounting unrest that were finally acted upon. The bombing would directly lead to an escalation in the number and lethality of attacks by both sides. The deeply held sentiments of both the right wing and left wing movements had been developing for many years and the escalation in 1969 and 1970 was the beginning in a rise of terrorism that would last into the eighties.

The decade of the nineteen sixties were the most important in the development and growth of leftist sentiments in Italy, but there were also two significant events that aided in the growth of the Leftist movement: the end of World War Two and the events of 1956. At the end of the war, Italy was a defeated country and its citizens wanted to put both the defeat of the war and twenty years of oppressive government behind them. During this time, it was relatively easy for any movement or political party that wasn't Fascist to gain support from the people. Drawing on the support for leftist parties dating back to the beginning of the century coupled with the appeal of anything not Fascist, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) were able to gain more public support and influence than they had at any previous time.⁵² From this point on, the Italian Left built its momentum with the events that occurred in 1956. In that year, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's report to the Communist party revealed the true

⁵¹ Ibid., 145.

⁵² Richard Drake, *The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy*. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 7.

horror of Joseph Stalin's government and especially the crimes committed during his purge trials and his distortions of history. The news of these revelations caused many Communists throughout the world to rethink their allegiance to Stalinism, but the true break between these Communists and the Soviet Union occurred with the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising later that year.⁵³ This event made clear, especially to Italian Communists, that both Stalin's form of Communism and the post-Stalin form of Communism were oppressive and corrupt. This public break with Soviet Communism made the PCI much less menacing and more appealing to the Italian public, who wanted both Western prosperity and a form of government that was as far removed from Fascism as possible. Thus, after 1956, the Italian leftist movement would be a rare but important combination of a radical, and sometimes revolutionary, left wing movement, which was not associated with the increasingly menacing Soviet left wing revolutionary movement.

In the 1960's, another development occurred that would eventually lead the extremists and revolutionaries within the left movement to create their own factions and subsequently, left wing terrorist groups, including the Red Brigade. In the aftermath of the disillusionment of the Italian leftists with the Soviet form of Communism, the leftist intellectuals in Italy began to rethink their ideology and the direction in which the left should be heading. These intellectuals expressed themselves through the publication of journals such as *Quaderni Rossi*, *Quaderni Piacentini*, *Classe Operaio* and *Scienza Operaia*. These journals expressed the desire of the intellectuals to reject both Stalinism and the temptation to cooperate with the Democratic government and thus, lose the

⁵³ Ibid, 39

revolutionary Marxist drive within the movement.⁵⁴ In the early nineteen sixties, the Italian government involved the socialist party in the government in an attempt to open up to the left and gain the support of the socialists. Although this allowed the left more access to the government than it had previously enjoyed, it was also fuel to the more extremist members of the left, who felt any acknowledgment or involvement with a government that was not revolutionary was to give up the Marxist fight. Outraged at this apparent betrayal, some of the more radical members of the left, motivated by more radical journals, created in 1966 a more revolutionary Communist Party⁵⁵ The Communist Party of Italy Marxist-Leninist (PC d'I (M-L)) became a critical component of the leftist movement when students from the University of Trento, including several that would go on to form the Red Brigade, joined. This party did not receive much initial support from the workers despite the promotion of the Italian worker to the forefront of the PC d'I (M-L)'s efforts. This initial lack of support from the workers was mainly due to the workers' sentiment that the party was a group of intellectuals and ideologues without much connection to the worker's grievances. The party did however, have strong support from students, and once the student protest grew, the PC d'I (M-L) was the critical component that created a unifying bond between the students and the workers.⁵⁶ Although France is generally credited with being the birthplace of the 1968 student

⁵⁴ Weinberg and Eubank, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*, 54.

⁵⁵ Pisano, *Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures*, 41.

⁵⁶ Alison Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State*. (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1989), 50.

uprisings in Europe, there were already strong currents of student discontent in Italy in early 1967. The protests that erupted in Italian universities in 1968 were due to massive dissatisfaction with the institutions: higher costs of tuition, more students with no provisions, no guaranteed diplomas for finishing the requirement and a generally archaic system. As the pitch of the student revolt rose, the leaders of the leftist movement moved the protest outside the university to the factory, the home of the Italian proletariat, the worker. After the student uprisings of 1968, the apex of the worker unrest came in the 'hot autumn' of 1969, when workers in northern Italy staged strikers, created disorder and even committed sabotage. In contrast to what occurred in other countries, the spread of protest from the university to the factory brought with it closer ties between the student and the worker.⁵⁷ This growing leftist movement did not intend to create terrorist groups such as the Red Brigade. It believed instead that a revolution of the masses would be the method for overthrowing the government. The creation of the terrorist groups was brought on by groups of revolutionaries who felt the existing leftist movement was not extreme enough or committed enough to bring about the revolution. Another reason for the emergence of left wing terrorist groups was ironically enough, the reemergence of extremist right wing Fascists. With the success of the left wing in gaining support from both the workers and the students, the Fascists felt a need to respond to the success of their political rivals.

⁵⁷ Donatella Dellaporta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 27.

C. THE FORMATION OF THE RED BRIGADES

As was mentioned earlier, the generally accepted birth date of modern Italian terrorism was December 12, 1969, when a bomb exploded in Milan. At first, left wing terrorist were accused of the bombing, but later it was blamed on right wing Fascists, whose 'strategy of tension' was intended to create such a high degree of public fear of terrorism that the public would accept another right wing oppressive government in order to combat the threat of terrorism. This attack by the right wing was in direct response to the success that the left wing was having in obtaining concessions from the government during their protests. The attack by the Fascists had the effect of catalyzing the more extreme members of the left to commit to action. The attack put the threat posed by the fascists into a tangible form that gave the left a sense of urgency in formulating a response. This threat posed by the fascists coupled with the frustrations of the more moderate factions of the leftist movement mobilized the revolutionaries of the left, and the Red Brigade was born.⁵⁸

Two of the founders and early leaders of the Red Brigade were Renato Curcio and his wife, Margherita Cagol. They met at the University of Trento where they both studied sociology and were soon immersed in the development of revolutionary ideals that would later drive the formation of the Red Brigade. They left the university in 1969 and moved to Milan to be closer to the worker's movement. In November, Curcio, Cagol and roughly 70 other like-minded individuals met to discuss taking the efforts of the

⁵⁸ Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State*, 60.

movement further and taking advantage of the opportunities for more extreme armed resistance. Curcio desired a movement, launched against not just the factory but against the entire establishment that would lead to a total European revolutionary struggle.⁵⁹ The right wing bombing in Milan occurred one month after the meeting and from here a split within this group took place. One faction, led by Curcio, believed the bombing was all that was needed to begin the armed resistance. The other faction was more moderate in their thinking and so until October of 1970, this moderate group engaged mainly in discussion and the distribution of propaganda leaflets. In October of 1970, the creation of the Red Brigade was formally announced by the more radical faction as "the most decisive and conscious part of the proletariat in struggle against the institutions that administer the exploitation of the people."⁶⁰ From here, the organization became significantly more militant in a short amount of time, calling for the education of the proletariat through armed struggle, which they considered the only acceptable means of ending the oppression of the masses. The initial strategy of the Red Brigade was armed propaganda. It was a combination of clandestine attacks against vehicles and private property belonging to industrial executives, known conservatives and rightist activists followed by the open distribution of explanatory literature. The aim of this practice was to raise the consciousness of the citizens and to "contribute to the formation of an elite

⁵⁹ Pisano, *Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures*, 45.

⁶⁰ Drake, *The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy*, 10.

that would later give birth to a truly combatant communist party.”⁶¹ These attacks took place in the Milan area due to an early lack of support in other areas, such as Rome, and were intentionally bloodless. During this period, the Red Brigade was not a completely clandestine group. Members of the group would publicly hand out propaganda after an action but this was short lived due to many arrests of group members and soon the group went completely underground.⁶²

Once the group went completely clandestine, it expanded operations to other cities besides Milan, including Turin and Genoa. This expansion was an attempt to increase the area affected by Red Brigade actions and make a larger number of people aware of the group and its grievances. The expansion in area of operations was in effect a substitute for handing out propaganda, which the group no longer did because it went completely clandestine. The Red Brigade escalated from its symbolic and sporadic actions against property to political kidnapping, with the first action occurring in March of 1972, when a manager of an electric company was kidnapped for under an hour and subjected to a mock trial against the working class. Four more similar political kidnappings occurred through the end of 1973, and in April of 1974, the Red Brigade carried out their most symbolic and ambitious action yet. On April 18, the Red Brigade committed itself to strike at the heart of the state with the kidnapping of state prosecutor, Mario Sossi, in Genoa. This action took the Red Brigade away from the factories and the

⁶¹ Michael Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 84.

⁶² Weinberg and Eubank, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*, 61.

local businesses and into direct confrontation with the state.⁶³ This shift by the Red Brigades coincided with a social and political transformation that occurred over the next two years, to the benefit of the group. During this time, a crisis in the labor movement radicalized many members who either felt themselves abandoned by increasingly politicized trade unions, left the union because they were unskilled or were victims of partial unemployment. The Red Brigade enjoyed increased support due to this crisis but at the same time, faced the imprisonment of many of their founding leaders and an escalation in the bloodshed of the conflict.⁶⁴ The rest of 1974 saw the arrest of many of the key leadership, including Curcio, the first murders carried out by the Red Brigade and the first member of the group to be killed. Although the Red Brigade successfully sprang Curcio from prison, the group did not have much better luck in 1975 than it did in 1974 with additional arrests and the death of Curcio's wife. Curcio was himself recaptured in early 1976 and the Red Brigade appeared as if it could no longer continue operations. However, the end of the 1970's saw a revitalization of the Red Brigade and a vast increase in the amount and lethality of violence.⁶⁵ Under new leaders, the Red Brigade began a terror campaign that included the murder of Genoa Attorney General Francesco Coco and near daily attacks of some degree. This campaign was so effective that the trial

⁶³ Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State*, 83.

⁶⁴ Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, 86.

⁶⁵ Weinberg and Eubank, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*, 64.

of Curcio set to begin in Turin was postponed due to an inability to find willing jurors.⁶⁶ The Red Brigade's most significant action took place on March 16, 1978 with the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Aldo Moro, the former Prime Minister and senior Christian Democrat leader. Although a military victory for the group, the action was definitely not a political victory. After the murder of Moro, most of the public denounced the Red Brigade for the senseless murder and within the group, a process of fragmentation began. A number of militants left the group as a demonstration of their disgust over the increasing levels of violence the group was committing. In fact, the entire branch of the organization in Milan broke from central direction, accusing the group of having lost all links to the working class.⁶⁷ Despite this, the number of attacks actually increased in the next several years, mostly in the form of attacks on police officers. The years of 1978, 1979 and 1980 saw a high number of deaths and injuries, but the group clearly lost support and capability after this, as shown by the sharp decrease in the number of deaths and injuries in 1981 and 1982. By this time, the group was on the defensive, fighting for its life. The targets of the group were selected with the aim of group-preservation, with almost no consideration given to the symbolic character of the targets, an approach that typified the earlier attacks. More attacks were carried out against officials and police officers who were part of the anti-terrorism efforts. The symbolic value of striking against a policeman or government official who worked for

⁶⁶ Drake, *The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy*, 27.

⁶⁷ Weinberg and Eubank, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*, 70.

the state was unintentional; the true intention of the attack was to reduce the numbers of personnel that these anti-terrorism agencies and efforts had at their disposal. Although attacks continued even past the February, 1984 assassination of American diplomat Leamon Hunt and the Red Brigade never officially announced the end of its struggle, it was clear that these attacks were carried out by radicals who were no longer part of a group but were instead individuals carrying out an attack on their own, in the hopes of keeping the name of the organization alive.⁶⁸

D. EFFECTIVENESS AT MOBILIZATION EFFORTS

Italian terrorist groups have been able to take advantage of the high degree of politicization of Italian society and the general acceptance of some level of violence to mobilize support and increase their resources. The Red Brigade was especially successful in mobilizing support; the group was able to continue operations in some form as a terrorist organization until 1984. In the few years before 1984 and in the years after, the Red Brigade faced a diminishing ability to mobilize its resources and by the middle of the eighties, the group was represented by radicalized individuals whose only goal was to preserve the name of the Red Brigade through individual action. The Red Brigade originated from student movements, which then spread to labor movements in the factories of northern Italy, which is where it was to subsequently get a majority of its new members and support.⁶⁹ In order to make a judgment on the Red Brigade's effectiveness

⁶⁸ Ibid., 73.

⁶⁹ Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, 86.

at mobilization, the three tests used previously will be applied: how inclusive the group and membership in it was of a member's everyday life, the separation between the group's ideology and identity and finally, how effectively the group frames its grievances and issues of contention.

In determining how completely an individual's membership encompasses daily life, the same criteria from the previous case study will be used: length of time in group, length of time each day dedicated to the group, the number of everyday social interactions that occur between group members and other people in which the membership of the group is somehow relevant, how early of an age group the terrorist group recruits from (to determine how strongly youth accept the appeal of the group,) and finally, the ability of members to seek refuge and comfort from those who are not members. Taken together, these factors indicate how effectively the individual is mobilized to support the group and the degree to which the individual is committed to the group. For the Red Brigade, membership in the group entailed a very high degree of inclusiveness of every day life. Although data on the average length of time in the group of an individual was unavailable, significant data was available, detailing the day-to-day activities of members. The group required its regular members to be engaged full time in the organization, live underground to avoid police detection and pursuit and to give up any regularly held jobs that were unrelated to the group.⁷⁰ The irregular militants,

⁷⁰ Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, 115.

responsible for support to the group but who had no direct involvement in actions, were allowed to live with their families and maintain normal lives outside of their group duties. The number of everyday social interactions that occurred between group members and other people in which membership was relevant was low, due to the high isolation of the members from day to day society. Without being able to live with their families or be employed in jobs unrelated to the group, members had little interaction with anyone besides fellow members. The recruitment age of the group varied, but due in part to the connection to the student movement, there were a sizable number of members who were fairly young. The appeal of the group was rather high with the youth movements of Italy due to the Red Brigades action oriented ideology along with the connection to the student movement. Lastly, the ability of the group to take refuge and comfort from non-members was fairly low because of both the isolated nature of the group and the lack of identification between the average non-member and the group member seeking shelter. The degree of isolation of the group members is a dominant theme in day-to-day membership and it was both beneficial and detrimental. Isolation was beneficial because it allowed for greater security to surround the group and because it led directly to a strong feeling of identification with the group, which translated to a persistence of commitment and a mobilization of an individual for a longer period of time.⁷¹ The detrimental aspects of the extreme degree of isolation of the group include a more arduous and cautious

⁷¹ Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," 158.

lifestyle, difficulty in recruiting due to lack of exposure to potential members, and a growing amount of political ignorance within the group about what is going on in the society, resulting in a skewed sense of reality. These problems caused by isolation can lead to members of the group wanting to leave in order to lead lives that require less personal sacrifice. Another possibility isolation raises is that members of a group could remain mobilized, but due to the ensuing political ignorance and errors in judgment, the members could become ineffective or counterproductive members of the group. The greater the extent to which members have a skewed sense of reality increases the likelihood that members of the group will use this skewed sense to form opinions that are different from the interests of the group. The danger with this is these members could cause internal dissent, begin calling for actions that in reality would cost the group support or at worst, commit one of these actions in the name of the group.

The next test of the group's effectiveness at mobilization is the evaluation of the separation between group identity and ideology. Unlike the ETA, which had a common identity of ethnicity and a separate ideology that shifted between ethnically based and class based aims, the Red Brigade's identity as a class based group is the same as its ideology. When both the identity and ideology are the same, there is little or no room for flexibility to adjust to changes in the political and cultural environment. The problem this can present for mobilizing resources is best exemplified by the loss of support the Red Brigade faced when its ideology of protecting the working class at the factory level shifted to bringing down the Italian state at the national level. The ideology of the group changed from being the protector of the proletariat to being the instigator of national

revolution, yet its identity remained as the group representing the oppressed classes. This led to accusations that the Red Brigade had lost touch with those it was originally fighting for and those that had given the group its initial support.⁷² Despite the group's insistence that its revolutionary foundation was the same, the isolation felt by the laborers as the group moved to a more national focus cost the Red Brigade the mobilization of potential members and supports.⁷³ Without much separation between its ideology and its identity, the Red Brigade's ability to mobilize suffered because any shift in its ideology to adapt to changing situations or to expand the scope of its goals resulted in the isolation and withdrawal of members who felt they no longer had the same identity as the group.

The final method in determining effectiveness at mobilization is to analyze how well the group frames and symbolizes its grievances and its aims. Framing is how a group presents its grievances and issues of contention, similar to packaging an opinion in order to make it more appealing to a larger group of people. By framing its grievances and aims effectively, a group can make joining it or supporting it much more attractive and make the costs associated with membership seem unimportant. The Red Brigade was effective at framing and symbolizing its grievances and ideology early on, but once the group became increasingly isolated and began committing what was perceived as excessive and unnecessary violence, its attempts at framing were no longer effective at

⁷² Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, 172.

⁷³ Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, 101.

mobilizing resources. Originally, the group was able to successfully frame the armed struggle and violence of the group as retribution for injustices and evils that had been done to the group. The group was also successful at portraying the armed violence it carried out not as terrorism, but as a struggle of heroic proportions equal to the Italian partisans fighting against fascists in World War Two.⁷⁴ An attempt at symbolization occurred as the group began to decline; the group began to think of its members as freedom fighters, in an attempt to romanticize the notion of a terrorist in a losing cause.⁷⁵ Once the group began to commit increasingly more violent acts with the only apparent purpose of preventing the extinction of the group, it became nearly impossible to frame this direction of the group in such a way as to be acceptable by a wide range of people. These senselessly violent attacks were hardly justified by Marxist-Leninist ideology so the group was forced to create their own revolutionary language and justifications for the violence. This language was comprehensible only to the members, reducing to nothing the possibility that this message would be understood and accepted outside of the group.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, 174.

⁷⁵ Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," 152.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 138.

E. CONCLUSION

The Red Brigade had mixed success in mobilizing its resources. Although the daily life of a member was thoroughly immersed in the group, ensuring that particular member's complete mobilization, the group became so isolated that the potential for extending this involvement of group membership to others outside the group became nearly non-existent. The Red Brigade did not have much success maintaining mobilization when it decided to modify its ideology. When it shifted its focus from the factory level and being the champion of the laborer to the national level and being the impetus for national revolution, it maintained the same identity which resulted in accusations of losing touch with the group of society that the group claimed to be protecting. Although there was support for the BR, there wasn't the level of grievances among the people to support a national campaign of extreme violence and terror directed at the state. Lastly, the group was originally able to successfully frame the grievances and aims of the group by claiming that armed struggle was merely retribution for the injustices done to them historically and that the struggle was not terrorism but instead a war of noble proportions on par with the fight against fascists in World War Two. But once the group began its unpopular campaign of violence, there was little it could do to successfully frame its grievances. By then, the group had already gone past the level of violence that could be reasonably justified, and the group attempted to create its own revolutionary language to justify its actions. The resulting incomprehensible language further isolated the group and led to further demobilization of its resources and support.

The successful framing of the campaign of violence was an impossible task; the level of grievances was not present to support a national campaign of violence aimed at the state.

V. CONCLUSION

A. RELEVANCE OF COMPARISON

The evaluation of a terrorist groups' ability to mobilize its human resources is an important step in gaining knowledge of a group and its operations. Terrorist groups are clandestine groups; they are almost always groups about which little is known. To combat or reduce the threat of a terrorist group, there must be an understanding of the group and an ability to make reasonably accurate predictions that would aid in the effort against terrorism. A knowledge of how effectively a group mobilizes its human resources is important for determining the size of the personnel base the group has to work with, how dedicated these personnel are, the amount of support the group has from non-members and even the amount of time the average member has been with a terrorist group. When one group's effectiveness at mobilization is compared to another group's effectiveness, predictions can be made about the groups. For example, a group that is more effective at mobilization than another can be predicted to be less likely to have its members lose focus or interest in the group. This information would be helpful in formulating a plan to combat the terrorist groups: to destroy a group more effective at mobilization, more effort and resources would be required than to eradicate a group less effective at mobilization. Other predictions could be made based on a comparison of two groups' ability to mobilize resources; judgments could be made on how likely a group would be to lose support and possibly members if its ideology changed or if the political environment changed, how motivated the members would be to persist through the deaths

or arrests of their leaders, or even how apt members would be to stay loyal to the group or to leave and join another faction based on needs and grievances. Although a comparison of only two terrorist groups will not give definitive criteria to apply to other terrorist groups, it will at least demonstrate the process and the usefulness in judging one group's effectiveness in mobilizing human resources over another group's effectiveness.

B. CLASS VERSUS ETHNICITY IN MOBILIZATION

The two terrorist groups selected for this thesis, the Basque separatist group Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Italian Marxist Leninist group Red Brigade (BR), were analyzed separately for mobilization effectiveness in chapters three and four, respectively. The three factors used in the case studies to determine group effectiveness will be the basis for the comparison between the two groups. The first of the three factors is how much of everyday life takes place inside the group (including amount of time each day membership requires, amount of daily interaction a member has with other members and non-members, the ability of members to seek refuge from those who aren't members and at how early an age each group recruits). The second factor is whether or not a group's ideology is independent from its identity; a group with an ideology that is independent of its identity has more flexibility to modify its ideology without the fear of losing the sense of a common identity with the group of supporters that are committed to the group based on that feeling of identity. The third factor is how well the group symbolizes and frames its grievances in order to appeal to a larger group of people; a group that is effective at framing and symbolizing its grievances will mobilize a large following behind it even if most of those people don't truly believe in those grievances.

Membership in both the ETA and BR is highly inclusive of everyday life, requiring a great deal of commitment from their members. Due to the clandestine nature of the BR, members have no opportunity to lead lives in society in addition to the life as a member of the group; the individual is required to be a full time group member and to spend his or her days apart from society. Members in the ETA do not spend this much time on a daily basis with the group; members of the ETA have lives outside of the group and are allowed to conduct their lives as integrated members of society, spending time with families and being employed in a manner unrelated to the terrorist group. In this respect, the BR is more effectively mobilized. But the isolation caused by the underground nature of BR membership also hurts mobilization in some ways. ETA members have more interaction with society and are part of the villages and neighborhoods in the cities in which they live; this interaction enables them to gain support for the group from people not in the group. The BR, meanwhile, has a minimum of interaction with society and neighbors due to the strict clandestine nature of membership.

Both groups recruited members from a very young age, the ETA using its ethnic identity to draw in youth and the BR using the student movement to appeal to younger members. In this test, however, the ETA is slightly more effective because its members were able to gain more support and refuge from neighbors and villagers than members of the Red Brigades were. This outside support was a significant advantage for the ETA, as it enabled the group to draw upon more resources and avoid government harassment more effectively.

The second gauge for judging mobilization effectiveness is the connection between identity and ideology. The ETA had an identity separate from its ideology. The ETA's identity was fixed; the common identity as a Basque was what the ETA used to create the bond of the group. The group's ideology was flexible, allowing for appeals to be made to a greater number of people. The flexible ideology could be altered without fear of accusations that the group had lost touch with those it had originally sought to protect. Whatever the ideology of the ETA, the group maintained its contact with those it sought to protect through its fixed identity of ethnicity. The Red Brigade, on the other hand, had an identity that was fixed to its ideology. The Red Brigade's original identity was the champion of the factory worker and the group's ideology was changing the capitalist labor system. Over the years, however, the BR's ideology changed to causing revolution in the heart of the state and the central government. Since the BR's identity was linked to its ideology, the change in ideology subsequently changed its identity and the factory workers and laborers felt isolated and abandoned. This was the cause of the accusations that the BR had lost touch with its constituents and supporters. Once the support of the laborers was lost, the Red Brigade was unsuccessful in mobilizing a group of supporters to replace the lost support of the laborers. In this test as well, the ETA was more effective in mobilizing its resources.

The final test of mobilization is the groups' ability to frame and symbolize grievances and aims. The ETA was highly successful at framing its grievances and appealing to the greatest number of people possible. The ETA was able to convince a large number of people to support its cause by framing its goals in terms of the protection

of the endangered Basque language and culture. Framing the group's goals as the protection of an endangered language and culture gained the group more mobilization of support than if it had framed its goals in terms of a stronger Basque economy or greater voting rights for the Basques. Unlike the ETA's continued success at framing its grievances in this way, the BR was able to successfully symbolize its grievances and aims at first, but later failed to do this, and subsequently suffered in its ability to effectively mobilize. Originally, the Red Brigade was able to frame what it was fighting for in the context of a heroic war along the same romantic lines as the left wing partisans fighting the right wing fascists in World War Two. The BR framed its grievances in terms of wanting retribution for all the evil that had been done to the people of Italy, a sort of crusade for justice that was very successful at earning support and mobilizing people. In the later years of the BR's life, however, the group's actions became increasingly and needlessly violent and gruesome. Attacks that were previously carried out for symbolic value were abandoned and attacks carried out to cause death and carnage were substituted. Once this change occurred, the group began having an increasingly difficult time framing its aims and grievances in such a way that would be accepted. The group lost a lot of its effectiveness in mobilizing when it began its ultra-violent campaign; its inability to justify and frame this violence hastened the group's loss of support and members as people began to want less and less to do with the BR.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS

The threat posed by terrorism is recognized as one that requires a great deal of attention and concerted effort. Not all countries have experienced the same degree of

internal terrorism as Spain with the ETA or Italy with the Red Brigades, but even a country with a minimal amount of terrorist activity within its borders needs to consider devoting efforts to combating this threat. Efforts at preventing an actual attack before it occurs are nearly impossible and attempting to demobilize a group before it engaged in terrorist violence would require the government to either guess at which groups would likely engage in violence or to demobilize all groups with grievances, both of which are unreasonable. Effectively combating terrorism requires preventing the group from sustaining its operations, which means preventing continued and effective mobilization. Efforts at countering terrorist mobilization efforts require not only diligence and patience, but also an accurate knowledge of the threat. Accurate knowledge of the terrorist group to be countered includes not only knowing how the group mobilizes people, but also how effective the group is at mobilization.

By knowing how a terrorist group mobilizes, the government that is combating the group can focus its efforts. A government that is combating a group mobilized around class concerns, such as the promotion of factory laborer, will direct its energy against the factories and the workers, not against an ethnic or a religious group. These efforts can include diplomatic efforts such as negotiations and concessions, intelligence gathering, such as surveillance and infiltration, or even applications of force, such as raids and arrests. These efforts will be largely ineffective if a government directs them against, for example, a group of nationalists when in fact, the terrorist group is mobilized on a Marxist ideology.

Knowing how effective a terrorist group is at mobilization is also important for government efforts. If a government has reliable information that individuals in a group are not mobilized effectively, the government might be able to entice the members to quit the group in exchange for amnesty and a return to a normal lifestyle. Terrorist groups that are more effective at mobilization will require a significant amount of effort and resources to combat; the groups will be more resistant to government efforts. Members that are effectively mobilized will be less likely to have their loyalty to the group swayed by government efforts.

Combating the threat posed by terrorist groups is difficult to accomplish. But by knowing how a terrorist group is mobilized and how effective it is at mobilization, efforts to combat the group can be focused and directed in a way that will be most effective at demobilizing the group and bringing about its demise.

D. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

The evaluation and analysis of terrorist groups can take into account numerous factors and considerations in an attempt to reach a meaningful conclusion about terrorism or terrorist groups in particular. This thesis has attempted to evaluate which type of terrorist group is more effective at mobilizing its human resources: class based or ethnically based groups. Besides the comparison between the effectiveness in mobilizing resources, other comparisons can be made between class based and ethnicity based groups. For example, the operational decision making process for ethnic and class based groups could be analyzed to determine if there is a different pattern in the way the two groups operate. Further analysis might be able to determine if this difference was the

result of the class or ethnic base. If there is a noticeable difference in operational decision-making, predictions could be made about the two groups future operations. Similarly, analysis could be done on the ability of both class based and ethnically based groups to withstand external efforts to weaken them, such as government efforts and effects of competing terrorist groups. Using this comparison, it could be determined if one type of group withstands direct government attempts to combat terrorism better than a different type of group. This would enable governments and authorities to predict which method might be most effective at combating terrorism.

Terrorism is a threat that has been present for centuries; it is not the most deadly of threats but it is certainly amongst the most unpredictable and hardest to combat. Efforts at combating a terrorist group require a knowledge of the adversary as in depth and accurate as the knowledge of an adversary in more conventional forms of warfare. With a better understanding of how a terrorist group operates, why it operates the way it does and the history of its operations, success in combating that terrorist group becomes easier to attain.

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